INTRODUCTION
Education in Brazil has been a widely-discussed subject since the pioneering work of Langoni (1973) because of its importance for economic development and reduction in income inequality. Barros et al. (2000) emphasize that education and its returns are responsible for nearly half of the wage inequality in Brazil. In fact, it should be noted that especially in the 90's the Brazilian economy was growing, spurred on by companies that had relatively sophisticated but stable technology. If we consider that the demand for education depends on a level of complexity and on the speed of changes in the technology, it is possible to understand the increase of wage inequality. The more complex the technology and the more quickly it changes, the more opportunities to use the knowledge gained through education arise. This can result in a greater disparity in income between those with education and those without it if the population fails to keep pace with an increasing demand for an educated work force. This disparity in incomes is the exact outcome experienced by Brazil, especially after the 90s, due to trade openness.
From a theoretical point of view, Becker and Tomes (1979) formulated a model of intergenerational transmission of inequality of income, including investment of parents in the education of their children. Later, Becker and Tomes (1986) incorporate interactions between fertility and human capital. They showed that while the transmission of the family "gifts" like financial or human capital are not very large, the families will go up and down, and back to average income within a few generations. The degree of social mobility and the time of convergence to the average income depend on the "degree of inheritance" of these gifts and opportunities in the market: the higher the "degree of inheritance", the lower the degree of social mobility. Becker et al (1990) expanded the model of Becker and Tomes in an aggregate model of growth that produces various equilibrium-states where less-developed economies are trapped in equilibrium with low-level income. In their model, an individual representing a less-developed economy invests too little in human capital of children and chooses a high level of fertility; this leads to a low per-capita income in the future. Furthermore, a representative agent in a rich country would do exactly the opposite, setting the economy in a more prosperous equilibrium. Raut (1990) has another mechanism for intergenerational transmission of economic inequality taking into account the interaction between fertility and investment in human capital. He showed that poor parents would choose a high fertility rate and low investment in physical and human capital of their children, while rich parents would do the exact opposite. Thus, in the equilibrium, there would be a fraction of the population that would be stuck at a low level of income. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of children's attainments. Their model deals with the effects of family choices and the neighborhood on the education of children. The outcomes include educational attainments, fertility choices and income of the individuals.
To understand the dynamics of the school level in an economy it is necessary to be convinced that it is an economic decision. Becker (1962) shows that it is an economic decision that weighs the costs and the benefits of the attained level of education. Therefore it has to take into account the remuneration evolution of an employee during the production cycle, the turnover between jobs, the large investment in education and the wage increases during the life cycle among the most educated workers. Later on Becker (1993) argues that in addition to improvements in wages and occupations, the benefits include greater stability and other non-monetary gains (status).
A final observation comes from the modern theory of human capital. It asserts that there are characteristics or "attributes" that determine personal productivity and as a result, the wage. The theory assumes that each individual receives exactly the value of its marginal productivity and this is related to a set of personal characteristics (like education). Such characteristics may be education, experience and income and education of parents (Malan and Wells (1973) ).
In this vein, this work analyzes the dynamics of school level choice in a dynamic programming problem where the individual chooses the current consumption level and the school level that he/she will give to his/her offspring. The returns of the education level (education level/wage curve) are exogenously taken and from empirical observation it has a convex-concave shape (S-shape curve). As a consequence we obtain an optimal policy which may have more than one stationary state. Some of them may be repellent and others may be attractors. This result explains the prevalence of polarization in education (and in wages as a consequence) and therefore the existence of the poverty traps. The study is applied to the Brazilian states. At the end of this paper we calculate these stationary states and analyze their sensitivity with respect to the educational cost changes in order to examine the impact of public education policies.
To calibrate the education level/wage curve we used the average wage data Our work was inspired by that of Nishimura and Raut (2007) . They consider a dynamic programming problem where the altruistic head of the family chooses the quality of the school of his offspring and consequently the possibility of intergenerational social mobility. They conclude that the existence of many qualities of school implies a non-concave earning function for the children; in this way, many steady-state equilibria emerge. With that result they are able to explain the existence of "poverty traps" which are attractor states with low income levels. The difference between their work and ours is that we do not deal with quality matters but with the possibility of children concluding, or not, a given level of education. Furthermore, our earning function depends on the level of education (which is an empirical fact observed in Brazil) and not on the quality of it. This paper is organized as follows: after this introduction we make a brief discussion on the costs and returns of education (section 2). In section 3 we describe the dynamic model of school choice. In section 4 we report the computed steady states of education and present an analysis of their sensitivity with respect to educational expenditures. Finally, section 5 contains the main conclusions. The calibration of the education level/wage function and the marginal costs of education are reported described in the appendixes 1 and 2.
COSTS AND RETURNS OF EDUCATION
There is a general consensus that wages and education are positively correlated variables. Langoni (1974) showed that in the decades of 1960 and 1970 Brazil exhibit high rates of returns on education. Recently, Barbosa Filho e Pessôa (2008) updated the Langoni findings and showed that initial education has an internal rate of return larger than 15%. But the highly educated worker not only has a higher wage but a lower chance of being unemployed. In Brazil, an individual with less than eight years of schooling had a probability of 17.6% of being unemployed in 2002.
After finishing high school (eleven years of schooling) his chances of unemployment fell to 10.9%. If he had begun but never finished university, the chances of unemployment were only 5.4% [Conjuntura e Educação (2004, p. 4) ]. Thus, investment in education not only has higher returns in terms of wages, but also has non-monetary returns. Guarantee of employment is one of these.
In addition to private returns of education, there are also social returns. In fact, several authors (Langoni (1973) , Barros e Lam (1993) , Menezes-Filho (2001)) associated the increase in education to economic growth, reduction of inequality and possibility of intergenerational mobility.
The fundamental idea is that labor is more than just a production factor. It should be considered a type of capital: human capital. This capital may increase and become more productive if the owner invests through education. That investment makes the human capital more functional and capable to follow the technological innovations.
The theory of human capital is incorporated in modern economic theory by Jacob Mincer, and "popularized" by Schultz (1960 Schultz ( , 1961 and Becker (1962) .
According to Mincer (1958) investment in education should be seen as an economic decision that evaluates the excess returns of having S years of schooling. Specifically, if 0 w is the wage without these years of schooling and w is the wage with schooling, then it must be held that:
Thus 
Some recent studies show some problems with the mincerian equations, specifically, the existence of a selection bias in the estimation of the parameter β. The problems may be caused by the linear dependence on the years of schooling and the separable form of the equations in education and experience. In this case, there would be a bias that overestimates the ability of β coefficient. Unrelated to this fact, human capital is still the main element in the econometric models used by economists to measure the returns of education.
Despite all the benefits and high returns of education it is observed that developing economies exhibit non-negligible portions of population with low levels of education. The explanation is not difficult: parents with low levels of schooling have low wages, so the relative cost of their children's education (and their opportunity costs) is high. For individuals with more education the opposite is true.
Thus, it is not surprising to obtain two (or more) stationary levels of schooling, as found in this article.
Therefore, a correct model to analyze the optimal dynamic decision of schooling must include the structure of the returns of education (the education level/wage function) and the cost specification of education. That is what will be shown in the next section.
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF SCHOOL CHOICE
In this section we present the main ingredients of the dynamic model of schooling choice. After that, we describe the model itself and solve it in order to find the equilibrium.
Returns of schooling
Using the RAIS 2007 database we analyze the dependence of the wage structure depending on the level of schooling in Brazil. We perceived that the education level/wage curve presents a convex-concave function shape in most of the Brazilian States. Figure 1 depicts the shape of that curve for some States. Thus, the returns of schooling (reflected in wages) has (low) increasing returns for the first years of education and for higher level of schooling it presents decreasing returns (Sshape). 
The calibrated parameters for other selected states are reported in Appendix 1.
The same shape may be obtained from other data bases (PNAD, POF). However, we chose the RAIS 2007 database because its disaggregation is more fitting for our analysis. 
Education expenditure function
The constants 1 k and 2 k are calibrated in order to ) (e g represent the annual expenditure in education relative to the maximum wage to achieve the level of education e. The calibrated parameters are reported in Appendix 2. Figure 2 shows the shape of this function for the Federal District (D.F.). The objective function in (3) is the classical separable one. It is important to notice that although the choice of consumption is for all the period of life, we can transform the problem in one which considers the annual consumption (using the average consumption per year). In this way, the budget constraint may be set in yearly terms. It is well known that to solve the problem (3) we have two approaches. The Bellman equation: 
and if the optimal path ,... , , 
From this equation (5), a very natural condition may be obtained:
which is the equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal real cost of education. It means that the willingness to substitute current consumption for future consumption must be equal to the net gain of increasing the level of the offsprings' education.
To solve equation (4) Maldonado and Svaiter (2007) .
In the next section we will report the steady states and their sensibility to changes in education cost. As we will see, there exists multiplicity of steady states and Figure 4 shows an example of the shape of an optimal policy function with three stationary states. As we can see, the modulus of the derivative of the optimal policy function This result reveals a perverse polarization in the education level: poor people will select a low level of education for their offspring and rich individuals (or at least those with high levels of education) will select a high level of education for their descendants. Such a polarization of education implies a polarization in wages which is an observed phenomenon in the USA (Rosenthal (1985) ) and in Brazil (Scorzafave e
Castro (2007) Finally, we may calculate the elasticity of the stationary state of the level of education with respect to the marginal cost of education. It can be done for both steady states using the Euler equation applied to the stationary state. Thus, the elasticity is: Steady states in boldface numbers are locally unstable; steady states in boldface numbers with " * " are just one-side stable; the others are stable. Such stability properties are found from the optimal policy functions estimated for each Brazilian State. In Figure 5 we show the optimal policy functions of some selected States. Notice that the elasticity for the lower state is in the most cases greater than that corresponding to the higher state. We may comment the rows corresponding to For the Acre State (AC), the low stationary state is 4 years and it is a source where education levels below this will be attracted to zero and levels above it will be attracted to 20.02 years of education, therefore we may observe the polarization of the education and thus of the wages. For the Alagoas State (AL) there exists just one steady state which is a sink corresponding to the level of 11 years. Since that is a nondifferentiable point for the return function, we can not calculate the elasticity. Goiás State (GO) has also an attractor in 18.54 years and any level of education below that and different from zero slowly converge to this stationary state. Paraná State (PR)
shows an interesting dynamics. It has three stationary states: i) e = 3.5, which is a source making that educational levels below that be attracted to zero; ii) e = 11, which is one-side stable, meaning that education levels between 3.5 and 11 are attracted to 11 and education levels above 11 are attracted to the next steady state; and iii) e = 15.39 which is locally stable. In that case we will observe a concentration in three levels of education, namely, zero, 11 and 15.39. A similar case we have for the Rio Grande do Sul State (RS), where education levels below 2.5 are attracted to zero, education levels between 2.5 and 14.11 are sank to e = 11, and education levels above 14.11 will be attracted to that level. Finally, the education level/wage structure of the São Paulo State (SP) guarantees a successive increasing in the educational level tending to 22. This exercise illustrates a more robust and qualitative conclusion: the low income family will strongly reduce the investment in education when the education cost is reduced. This is because the returns of schooling for low levels do not compensate the investment, thus that family prefers to increase its current consumption. On the other hand, high income families will increase their investments in education because its returns are high and the marginal utility of consumption is low. Once again, we may conclude that the S-shaped curve of education returns implies the existence of the poverty trap. 
CONCLUSIONS
The influence of the education level of an individual on the education level of his descendants is a phenomenon frequently verified through econometric tests in diverse economies. The altruism of the agents in relation to their offspring plus the perception of future returns of education conflict with current consumption decisions.
The optimal choice between these two variables is found when each income unit displaced from consumption to the education level of the offspring compensates the returns they will receive in the future.
In this paper we model all these elements using a dynamic programming problem which represents the decision of altruistic families with respect to the investment in their offspring's education. The head of the family, taking into account the future returns of the education he will provide for his child, decides current consumption and the level of education that will be given. The key component in our model is the absence of concavity in the objective function, which comes from the fact that the returns function of education investments is a convex-concave function.
This is an empirical fact observed in data collected from each Brazilian state. The non-concavity of the function permits the appearance of multiple steady states for the optimal education level. In particular, we may obtain two steady attractor states; one with a low level of education and the other with a high one. This explains the existence of a poverty trap. The two steady attractor states also reveal the polarization in the schooling levels of the economy. In some cases it is possible to observe the presence of even three steady attractor states.
We apply the model to the main Brazilian states of the Federation. To calibrate the education returns function we use the RAIS database and to estimate the education cost function we use a database from INEP/MEC. With these functions we found the optimal policy functions and the stationary states of the education levels for the main states of Brazil. An elasticity calculation exercise is also performed to evaluate the impact of cost reductions in education through the implementation of public policies. The result is that the policy-maker must consider that reducing the cost in education for low levels may have a perverse effect of school drop-outs. This is because the opportunity cost of keeping the child at home for poor families is high in relative terms. This must be seen as a defense for social programs of conditional income transfers, where the counterpart must be the permanence of the children in school.
It is worth noting that the results strongly depend on the shape of the education level/wage curve 1 . It is a strong hypothesis to assume that this curve will remain with that shape for all generations. A general equilibrium model which captures the feedback between the supply of high and low qualified labor forces and the demand of these inputs for production may be more realistic to identify a stable shape for the education level/wage relationship.
APPENDIX 1
The education level / wage curve 
